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Oxfam and the problem of NGO aid appraisal in the 1960s 
 
Matthew Hilton 
University of Birmingham 
 
 
In 1968 the humanitarian and development charity Oxfam asked a simple question: does aid 
work? What this meant in practice was that it appointed its first Aid Appraiser. Bernard 
Llewellyn’s job was to visit and report on various Oxfam projects around the world and come 
to a clear decision as to whether he believed the organisation’s money had been well spent. 
On his own, working as an early pioneer of rudimentary project evaluation within the NGO 
sector, he was unlikely ever to answer the larger question about the effectiveness of 
development that has, and continues to be, asked of the aid sector more generally. But in this 
essay I want to explore what happened when one aid agency asked the question of itself and 
examine the internal dynamics of the responses to reports of success or failure. As 
anthropologists such as James Ferguson and David Mosse have noted, the most important 
question to ask of development is less whether projects work and more how they are claimed 
to do so:  that is, there is a ‘social life’ to aid appraisal, how success is ‘produced’ and how 
reports are received and interpreted by various institutions and actors with a stake in the 
development infrastructure.1 
 At the time of Llewellyn’s appointment, NGOs were still relatively minor players in a 
global system of development dominated by the United Nations and bilateral assistance. 
Since then, and especially from the 1970s, the number and size of NGOs has expanded 
almost exponentially. There has been growing interest in whether their more local, grassroots 
initiatives have proved more effective mechanisms for assisting some of the very poorest 
communities in the world. Do NGOs Make a Difference? is the straightforward title of one 
such volume devoted to the topic, though the question itself lies at the heart of a burgeoning 
literature on the role of the voluntary and charitable agencies.2 Indeed, measuring the 
effectiveness of aid has become an area of expertise in itself, with guidelines and training 
programmes appearing for a growing professional body of aid appraisers.3  
Ferguson’s investigation of how aid works on the ground famously pointed to the 
systems of governance at work in which the true beneficiaries of the aid regime are not the 
imagined poor recipients but all those with an interest in the maintenance of the machinery of 
aid itself. His analysis has been extended such that NGOs have become implicated within the 
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systems of governmentality at work within developmentalism. NGOs have been charged with 
having done less to reduce poverty and more to promote technocratic, global norms and 
liberal values as modern-day missionaries.4 In one of the few historical studies of aid and 
development NGOs, Gregory Mann further suggests that organisations like Oxfam were 
incorporated into what he has termed ‘the road to nongovernmentality’ from the 1970s 
onwards.5 In this essay, I want to suggest that we might identify such tendencies even earlier 
and that the dynamics within organisations themselves – as opposed to the wider institutional 
infrastructure of the developmental machinery – promoted a similar tendency to self-
perpetuation. How Oxfam responded to self-critique shows us that the capacities for 
organisations to engage in self-assessment, absorb criticism, expand and maintain a positive 
vision of their future direction were evident as soon as appraisal began. 
The 1960s were a crucial period in the history of aid. It was the time of the UN’s First 
Development Decade, and the moment when NGOs, previously committed principally to 
short-term humanitarian emergencies, forged a place for themselves within the professional 
world of long-term development. It was also a moment when criticisms of aid and 
development became more pronounced. From the left, aid was charged with maintaining the 
economic balance of power in the west, promoting capitalist neo-colonialism or, as Kwame 
Nkrumah put it, ‘the last stage of imperialism’.6 And from the right, critics of aid such as 
Peter Bauer were beginning to focus on what they saw as inappropriate and damaging 
government intervention in the market which, left alone, would eventually bring economic 
prosperity to all.7 By the end of the decade, the UN did acknowledge the need to hold its 
various institutions to account. In 1969, R. G. A. Jackson reported on the lack of co-
ordination, waste of funds and absence of appraisal across the entire UN infrastructure, 
preparing the way for a renewed focus on evaluation at the UNDP during the second 
Development Decade of the 1970s.8 
Oxfam was not immune from such critiques and its creation of the role of Aid 
Appraiser was but the first of many such appointments that would later be made in the NGO 
sector. The man it put in place was a career aid worker who had begun as a relief worker in 
China with the Friends Ambulance Unit and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
before moving on to the Save the Children Fund in Korea.9 A dour personality, Llewellyn 
upset the more enthusiastic voices within the organisation who were less prepared to hear 
how the money Oxfam had extracted from the British public could often, according to 
Llewellyn, go to waste. It is precisely these responses to appraisal  - newly available in NGO 
archives – that tell us much about the nature of NGO development policy. No matter how 
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much he might tell the organisation it had made mistakes in its operations, or had engaged in 
enterprises in which the goals and the outcomes were never really articulated or understood, 
he did little to check Oxfam’s inexorable expansion or limit its willingness to support an 
incredibly diverse portfolio of aid programmes. His colleagues could be deaf to his 
declarations of failure and waste of funds. Always hopeful that money raised in good faith 
would be spent effectively by those who meant well, their optimism overshadowed 
Llewellyn’s occasionally glum findings. Eventually, he was to call this the ‘Oxfam bias’, 
articulating more prosaically what future scholars would describe as the self-perpetuating 
logic of the governmentality of aid. 
 In what follows, the first section traces the debates over aid appraisal within Oxfam 
throughout the 1960s, during a period of rapid expansion and some radicalisation of the 
organisation. A second section then details how individuals within the organisation responded 
to the reports of the Aid Appraiser. As David Mosse has argued, studies of the depoliticising 
effects and consequences of the aid machinery too often ignore the human voices and agency 
within and across institutions. Actors deliberately chose to re-articulate project evaluations in 
what amounted to a ‘social construction of success’ and which in turn served to maintain the 
support structures for those corners of development which diverse individuals had an interest 
in defending.10 This article does not claim to offer a comprehensive account of non-
governmental aid programmes at the end of the UN’s first development decade. What it does 
is draw attention to the internal dynamics of one organisation that provides clues to how 
NGOs spurred themselves on to the ambitious plans for growth and expansion that would be 
realised in future decades. Internally, NGOs operated their own systems of governance which 
seemed at times to resemble a confederacy of optimists. That is, while each individual had his 
or her own areas of concern and professional interests to protect, all shared a faith in the 
essential worth of their organisation. While NGOs facilitated the increasing 
professionalization of their work in all spheres, they also always ensured that hope triumphed 
over despair. In this sense, growth and expansion were almost the inevitable consequences of 
the internal logic of the assessment of aid. 
 
Aid appraisal and the decade of development 
 
The significance of the UN’s first Development Decade of 1960s was not only for the 
official, technocratic machinery of aid infrastructure associated with inter-governmental 
organisations. It also served as a catalyst for voluntary organisations, charities, and NGOs 
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around the world. Bodies such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) became 
concerned not only with prestige economic and technical infrastructure projects but also with 
meeting the needs of the hungriest people. Particularly through the Freedom From Hunger 
Campaign (FFHC), launched in 1960, the FAO aimed to raise awareness of development 
issues among the global public and to enrol the voluntary agencies into development projects 
by supporting agricultural improvement schemes. British NGOs – and Oxfam in particular – 
were enthusiastic backers of the Campaign. As additional funds reached the coffers of the 
leading NGOs, they searched for new projects around the world and soon created an 
impressive portfolio of grassroots schemes that transformed the nature of their purpose and 
goals.11 By the end of the decade, the British NGO sector had been transformed. Oxfam’s 
income alone grew from less than £10 million (adjusted for inflation) before the launch of the 
FFHC, to over £30 million by 1970.12 Moreover, as well as the transformation of the agencies 
from short-term humanitarian relief charities into long-term development NGOs, the sector as 
a whole found its political voice. Oxfam and Christian Aid led the way in radicalising the 
sector. The charities spoke collectively through advocacy bodies such as the Voluntary 
Committee on Overseas Aid and Development (VCOAD), set up as the main point of liaison 
with the Ministry of Overseas Aid from 1965, through campaigns such as the Haslemere 
Declaration of 1968 calling for more official funding, through run-ins with the Charity 
Commissioners as they seemed to overstep their charitable remit with their more collective 
political pronouncements, and through the establishment of new pressure groups such as the 
World Development Movement in 1969.13 
 Such rapid changes inevitably brought tensions within organisations as the 
recruitment of new, younger staff led to impatient demands for faster and more radical 
change. Oxfam created a position of deputy director and made the ambitious appointment of 
an outspoken campaigning clergymen, the Rev Nicholas Stacey. He very publicly resigned 
from the organisation in 1970 when he felt the pace of change was still insufficient. In a letter 
published in the national press he complained that he felt compelled to leave as he did not 
‘fancy [him]self primarily as a fund raiser’.14 Yet the younger staff nevertheless continued to 
push not only for an expansion of field operations (Oxfam was not yet ‘operational’ itself on 
the ground at this stage, still preferring to fund the work of others), but also for still further 
collaboration at home with the likes of Christian Aid and War on Want.  
The younger staff were often up against the generation of trustees and employees who 
had been with the organisation since its early years, some all the way to 1942, and who could 
express scepticism at the pace of change across the sector. Bernard Llewellyn, although only 
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joining the organisation in 1958, was very much a part of this older spirit. A former 
Methodist and conscientious objector, he had become impressed with the work and 
compassion of the Quakers during his time in China. The lessons he learned there had an 
indirect influence on how Oxfam operated, not least because in China Llewellyn came across 
Michael Harris and Ken Bennett, two other volunteers with the Friends Ambulance Unit who 
also went on to work with Oxfam. Indeed, it meant Oxfam’s first three Overseas Aid 
Directors (Llewellyn, Bennett, Harris), covering the period all the way up to the early 1980s, 
were all products of a ‘unique grounding’ provided by the Quaker FAU in China.15 For 
Llewellyn, but also others within the organisation, it meant that throughout all the trends in 
later long-term development thinking, at the core of his humanitarian conscience would 
persist a commitment to hands-on emergency relief work, especially that provided by 
volunteers motivated above all by compassion and with little knowledge of the wider political 
complexities that lay behind the causes of suffering. 
 Amidst this potential for conflict between an older generation who placed limits on 
the role of the humanitarian and the younger, modern aid workers who wanted to speak out 
on so many other issues there was actually strong agreement that assessing the impact of aid 
was important. As Oxfam began to embark on new ventures through Freedom From Hunger 
they all acknowledged that some rudimentary assessment was required of where and how the 
extra funds were being spent and to what ends. Given his experience of actual relief work on 
the ground – a skill in relatively short supply in many a NGO – Llewellyn soon found himself 
being flown around the world to report on Oxfam’s increasingly diverse range of projects. It 
was not long before he was calling for the proper appraisal of projects both at the outset and 
upon completion. He quickly concluded of a visit to Austria in 1961, for instance, that ‘all aid 
programmes are easier to start and to continue than to stop or change’.16 He was aware that 
there was often a mismatch in the charitable field between the ‘inadequacy’ of the written 
requests from organisations outshined by those better at ‘selling projects’ to donors such as 
Oxfam.17 Closer control was required. Payments were made yet few checks were carried out 
and the failure to provide reports was often overlooked.18 Agencies did not co-ordinate. As a 
consequence, donations might be made according to the whim of the funder rather than the 
needs of the recipient. In Algeria in 1962 he was particularly appalled to find an unused 
German Red Cross operating theatre.19 Reports of a crisis, as he felt of Hong Kong in the 
same year, could misrepresent what was taking place thereby misdirecting funding and 
leading to the ‘embarrassment’ of the government of the affected communities.20 
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Returning to Asia in 1964 as Field Director for the entire region, he found many 
‘monuments to human folly and wasted aid’.21 Back in Korea he remained ‘depressed by the 
ease with which this country soaked up foreign aid to so little purpose’. The massive aid 
programmes failed to prioritise appropriately while Oxfam, ‘filling in the gaps left by the 
bilateral aid programmes’, and in trying to support so many missions and local initiatives was 
‘blown about by contrary winds and opinions’.22 In Pakistan, he gloomily concluded that the 
milk powder distributed in aid packages usually ended up in the tea houses through the black 
market.23 
 Llewellyn remained a forceful advocate for the traditional recipients of Oxfam’s 
funds, though he warned too of those who showed a little too much ‘faith in Providence’.24 
He cautioned too over the willingness to work with the official aid programmes and with host 
governments. He suspected, for instance, that many of the agricultural schemes launched 
through FFHC had absolved the late colonial state of some its responsibilities, especially in 
the High Commission Territories of southern Africa.25 He believed the rapid expansion of the 
aid sector in the 1960s had even influenced the approach to natural disasters. For instance, he 
felt the reporting of the East Pakistan cyclone tragedy in late 1965 was terribly exaggerated, 
fuelled by the eagerness of the British charities to showcase their ability to respond.26 He 
knew that pointing out all these pitfalls might achieve little as others would dismiss his 
‘cynicism or world-weariness’ but he believed it vital for the staff at the aid agencies to keep 
their feet on the ground amidst this rush to expand all over the world.27 
 This is not to argue that he was opposed to the grandiose aid programme when he felt 
it necessary. He remained enough of a technocrat to realise that in countries such as India a 
massive mobilisation of effort would be required to re-orientate the entire country’s 
agricultural and distribution systems. Later, he would become an advocate of integrated 
development schemes. The key to all was good planning and the clear articulation of 
objectives. The smaller scale, more realisable projects that he was predisposed towards could 
then be brought together as a more coherent whole, in which the overall goals were set out in 
advance. What he did not want was forcibly expressed in a frustrated letter he wrote to 
Oxfam’s Director, H. Leslie Kirkley, in 1965: 
 
Of course Oxfam has a contribution to make – but in doing its primary job, not in this guise of a 
glorified Honey Bee buzzing hither and thither, meddling in this and that, rather like an overgrown 
Lady Bountiful acting as a catalyst wherever possible, stirring up jealousies in other groups who 
are not so ubiquitously busy both saving the world and other organizations from themselves. Just 
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who do we think we are? . . . What’s coming over you, Oxfam? Where’s the business mind and 
approach which I once found so refreshing after long years of doing good. . . . [W]e go to 
committees with arguments charged with emotive platitudes that may or may not be true, are 
scarcely specific enough to contradict, sound highly principled enough to command support, and 
give people who are not too clear what it is all about the feeling that, even if the United Nations is 
not looking too healthy, there is always Oxfam ready to step into the breach.’28 
 
For Llewellyn, the solution lay in a clearer set of guidelines as to what Oxfam’s 
policy on aid actually was. This, he believed, had to be set out according to measurable 
criteria that could be later assessed with some degree of accuracy and with the expectation 
that conclusions could be drawn as to whether objectives had been met. After firing off a 
whole series of memos, reports, and responses, Oxfam finally accepted his point and 
appointed him Aid Appraiser in 1968.29  
For all that Llewellyn’s own methods of aid appraisal were self-taught, often 
instinctual and certainly amateurish compared to the later levels of skill and expertise 
exercised within the evaluation profession, the appointment was significant for the time. His 
frank admissions stood out amidst the more positive and upbeat tones adopted by other 
visitors to the field. Staff from headquarters would generally visit a great number of projects 
over a period of 2-4 weeks. They would be quickly shown around a scheme by a local field 
director or project manager and they would come away sufficiently swayed to recommend 
the continuation or extension of funding. They would then be whisked off to the next project 
and at the end of their visit they would set out a few conclusions that emphasised how 
Oxfam’s work was perfectly sound. Some occasionally admitted there to have been one or 
two exceptions, though their reports, with the exception of Llewellyn’s, were written to leave 
a confident and favourable impression.30 If none went so far as C. M. Carruthers, the field 
officer for Africa from 1965, that ‘Oxfam is a symbol of hope’, most were guilty of using 
similar and not entirely relevant ‘emotive platitudes’ referred to by Llewellyn in the quotation 
above.31 
Llewellyn aimed to work alongside Field Directors, assessing completed projects such 
that the Field Director could make more informed judgments for the future. He planned to 
consult technical experts when appropriate, always raise the question of costs, quantify 
results where possible, make overall judgments and work in collaboration with other tentative 
forays into appraisal being made by academics consulted by the FFHC (particularly at the 
LSE, the University of Sussex and the Netherlands Economic Institute at Rotterdam). In the 
future, he envisioned even more detailed and professional reports being written by outside 
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experts. But in 1968 at least, what he felt Oxfam most needed was a single individual 
prepared to make a ‘fairly brusque appraisal’ and who had ‘a readiness to stick out one’s neck 
and make a judgment rather than sitting astride the fence’.32  
 What he therefore established was a rather basic system of appraisal. Projects were 
classified from ‘A’ to ‘F’, with ‘A’ signifying ‘excellent use of funds’ to ‘F’ ‘bad use of 
funds’. He based his judgment on four criteria – effectiveness, efficiency, significance and 
lessons learned – while creating an additional category of ‘UFA’ (‘Unsuitable for 
Appraisal’), meaning in his view ‘our Oxfam inputs are so lost or the purposes and the 
achievements of the project so diffused that nobody could fairly judge them’.33 Each report 
Llewellyn produced opened with an overview of the general situation in the country or region 
visited, in a style not dissimilar to the introductory comments he used to make about the 
places he visited when he had attempted to become a travel writer.34 It was then followed by 
a summary assessment of each project funded by Oxfam with an accompanying grade. 
Llewellyn would then end with a summary of ‘lessons deriving’ before totalling up how 
much of Oxfam’s finances had been devoted to each category of appraisal. 
 The successes and failures Llewellyn identified could be quite specific to any one 
project, but the general lessons learned tended to be in keeping with much of what he had 
expressed previously, both before and after his appointment with Oxfam. He was particularly 
concerned with projects that had been running for some time but which had either failed to 
attract local funding or had given little thought to longer term sustainability.35 He awarded 
low grades to schemes where it was not obvious what Oxfam was trying to achieve: a 
particularly shambolic school feeding scheme in Kenya was judged to be ‘a costly attempt to 
fly before we can walk’.36 And he argued there was too often a danger that Oxfam’s principal 
effect would be to prop up a weak central government. Britain’s total official aid package for 
Malawi, for instance, had fallen from £6 million in 1964 (the year of independence) to just £2 
million. The Malawi government clearly had little in its own budget for development work 
and Llewellyn believed Oxfam was being sucked into long term projects from which it could 
never hope to withdraw.37 Here, he was especially appalled by the ‘disaster’ of the £19,000 
given for the building of a new dining hall and kitchen block at the Magomero Community 
Development Centre. The building was ‘beautifully designed, spacious, good to look at’ but 
which Llewellyn berated as the ‘Malawi version of the Sydney Opera House . . . as a symbol 
of Oxfam generosity’: ‘If this can be justified, is there anything that can’t?’38 
 By way of contrast, he awarded high grades to those schemes which created no lasting 
financial legacy and which had a very real impact on a precise number of people, such as 
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with agricultural education classes in existing schools and a specific medial initiative at a 
Family Health Centre run by the Anglicans (‘I seldom feel that money given to mission 
hospitals is other than well used’).39 And lest it be thought Llewellyn’s curmudgeonly 
appraisals were wholly out of tune with the rest of the staff in Oxfam, it should be noted that 
he enthused about the ‘A’-graded village agricultural experiment of the Ruvuma 
Development Association in Tanzania, despite identifying a whole series a specific problems. 
Here he shared in Oxfam’s general optimistic embrace of President Nyerere’s ujaama 
philosophy that would ultimately see the charity expend many hundreds of thousands of 
pounds to questionable ends.40 
 The summary totals of expenditure under each classification that appeared at the end 
of every report could make for painful reading. So too were the collations he provided at the 
end of the year. In 1970, for instance, reporting on 66 projects across 3 continents, he found 
that only 13 had been awarded an ‘A’ rating. A further 25 received a ‘B’ but the rest were 
spread across the other – unsatisfactory – grades (6 at ‘C’; 9 at ‘D’; 3 at ‘E’; 1 at ‘F’ and 9 as 
‘UFA’).41 He later added a further 34 projects to his calculations and argued that only 
projects graded ‘A’ and ‘B’ could be regarded as acceptable for an organisation of Oxfam’s 
reputation and standing. He summarised this to mean that only 49 projects (out of 90) could 
be regarded as ‘good’. A further 41 it was necessary to conclude had not been worth the 
money expended (£208,700) or else fell into the UFA category (£173,500). As Llewellyn put 
it, ‘496,000 spent on good projects out of £878,900 is not enough’. Repeating his apiaristic 
accusation that Oxfam had become ‘a hive of do-gooding activity’ in all areas, he concluded 
‘that the real quality and effectiveness of what we are doing matter less to us than the image 
of our involvement and ubiquitousness.’42 
 It is unsurprising that Llewellyn used these findings to trigger a more general set of 
reflections on his part about Oxfam’s aid policy. He was against the ‘ad hoc’ approach which 
had seen Oxfam expand into any country to provide any type of assistance. Instead, he 
wanted to develop a consistent policy which would force staff at the charity to make real 
choices about the type of work it wanted to fund. He favoured a more integrated approach to 
development in which a variety of projects might still be supported but within ‘areas of 
concentration’ such that each initiative might work in support of one another over the longer 
term and aid would not be wasted through being spread too thin to be effective.43 But in 
doing so, the role of the aid appraiser would need to be amended as well. When he took up 
his post, he had not thought his reports should be used to direct policy within the 
organisation. Rather, the aid appraiser would merely assess projects determined from above. 
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But so problematic had he found Oxfam’s aid policy – or what he perceived to be its absence 
– that he felt obliged to extrapolate from his findings.  
 
 
A confederacy of optimists 
 
The whole question of Oxfam’s future direction became caught up in how staff within the 
charity responded to an aid appraiser and his reports. Llewellyn knew that the principal 
problem with his position was that his colleagues could simply ignore his findings if they so 
wished.44 This realisation coincided with the more general expansion of Oxfam’s activities 
into advocacy work and a more assertive public role on questions of global justice. NGOs 
were coming into their own on the development landscape, a phenomenon acknowledged in 
Lester Pearson’s 1969 report for the World Bank, Partners in Development, which estimated 
that NGOs globally were handling around $1billion of aid annually.45 Llewellyn found 
himself out of step with these trends and his ‘gloomy’ appraisals only seemed to isolate his 
voice further amidst the youthful optimism that appeared to sweep through the organisation 
and the charitable sector more generally at the end of the 1960s. 
With a growing sense of frustration, Llewellyn began to ruminate on the whole ethos 
of Oxfam and the development machinery generally, offering insights into what might be 
regarded as the self-perpetuating – and possibly self-interested – nature of the expansive logic 
of the bureaucracy of aid. He began to ask fundamental questions about the reorientation of 
Oxfam’s role. As field officers sought out ever more projects and functions for Oxfam, he felt 
they were making up policy on the spot and taking the organisation down paths they had no 
right to go. It was not clear to him whether they were serving as a ‘dynamic catalyst’ or an 
‘inveterate meddler’. Without clear guidelines, they were expanding Oxfam’s role without 
questioning whether, for instance, they were trampling over the work of indigenous voluntary 
agencies or taking the place of local government and politicians. 
In other projects, it was not always clear what the precise level of need was and, in the 
absence of proper cost-benefit analysis, there was no sense of prioritising certain types of aid 
over others, since everything was claimed to be effective and all costs and expenditure could 
be justified. Oxfam had rightly been wary of funding activities that were properly the 
function of governments but on the ground, as Llewellyn put it, ‘our actions speak louder 
than our reservations’.46 He thought it entirely understandable that Ministries supplemented 
their own meagre resources when Oxfam made the funds so easily available. Too little 
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attention had been given to Oxfam’s relationship with indigenous partner organisations with 
the outcome being that Oxfam funds were being used to expand agencies rather than meet the 
original need. He found numerous examples of types of project that showed poor results 
wherever implemented – e.g. school gardens – yet Oxfam kept giving money to support these 
wherever it could. Capital investments had been poorly monitored and planned, with the very 
worst leading to repeat grants and the creation of what staff at Oxfam commonly referred to 
as ‘bottomless’ pits.47 
At a more general level he argued that Oxfam needed to decide once and for all 
whether it wished to support types of projects that were known to produce results, or to focus 
on the most needy in the developing world. The latter were those to which all of Oxfam’s 
publicity claimed it was helping yet much actual funding went to the former and there was 
even evidence that this could increase inequalities as the very poorest were left further 
behind.48 Moreover, Llewellyn believed it created exactly the type of dependency associated 
with official aid which he thought Oxfam had tried to avoid. As Oxfam expanded its range of 
agricultural schemes, especially those which planned for the future rather than relieving 
suffering in the present, it created a relationship that was ‘rather like putting someone in a 
heart-lung machine. He has to be kept there for as long as it is needed’.49  
Eventually, he reflected more abstractedly on why it was that both his specific 
assessments of projects and his more general conclusions were not taken into account by his 
colleagues to inform policy and practice.50 The phrase he employed to get to the heart of the 
problem was the ‘Oxfam bias’. As a harbinger of later ‘future positive’ tendencies within 
development policy, he defined the bias as ‘the desirability of being optimistic about aid in 
general and Oxfam’s programme in particular so that increased public support may be 
obtained’. His role as aid appraiser had made him aware of its power and hold over the 
organisation: ‘the bias is constantly reinforced by the inbuilt non-accountability’.51  
Llewellyn knew full well that aid was a risky business and that these risks had to be 
embraced if one was to do good in an uncertain world. But because of the absence of 
accountability many projects could claim benefits for themselves which were never put to the 
test. Thus every project with an advocate in the organisation would find itself supported and 
argued to be in accord with Oxfam’s core mission. This ‘optimistic tendency’ was then 
further encouraged by the interconnections between project publicity and funding allocations, 
the ready amounts of cash the organisation was raising and the willingness of both Oxfam 
and the public to assume that being seen to be doing good equated with actual effectiveness. 
This was not to argue that there were no internal controls. Care was taken in the selection of 
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projects. But no judgments were made about their relative worth or the perceived benefits 
measured against the costs expended. Putting it in the language of his own grading system, 
his conclusion was that ‘UFAs are in no way discouraged.’52 Putting it in the language of 
govermentailty, the logic of governance internal to the institution provided frequent 
opportunities for those with a stake in a project to make claims for its success. 
Lllewellyn knew right from his appointment as Aid Appraiser that he would be a lone 
voice. His pronouncements would always run up against those who had a personal interest or 
emotional attachment to the maintenance of a particular project. So while he was given free 
rein to comment on any project, the actions arising from his findings were constrained. As the 
Oxfam Executive put it, ‘it was important that the Appraiser should not be a dictator’ and that 
his reports would always be ‘open to discussion’.53 Field Directors were further reassured 
that they retained the ‘formal responsibility’ for deciding on new projects, leaving them 
relatively free to ignore Llewellyn’s advice if they so wished.54 
 The effects of such rules on Oxfam practices can be found in the detailed work of the 
aid bureaucracy. The organisation’s Africa Committee, for instance, always expressed its 
willingness to take on board Llewellyn’s observations at the general level, but some member 
would likewise always find fault with any specific recommendation or conclusion. Malcolm 
Harper, a field director in Africa with a far cheerier disposition than Llewellyn, followed up a 
discussion of a set of appraisals for East Africa with a five-page rejoinder sent directly to Ken 
Bennett, the then Overseas Aid Director. In it, while stating that he agreed with the general 
findings, he went through every project Llewellyn had assessed offering correctives and 
counter evidence that painted a less ‘gloomy’ picture. Instead, he argued variously for more 
time, for more effort, for more consideration of other voices, for greater clarity from 
Llewellyn and for the taking into account of less quantifiable evidence that might provide a 
more positive conclusion. Occasionally, the tone could become petulant. Of Llewellyn’s 
questioning of support for government schemes in Tanzania, Harper responded with the 
threat: ‘perhaps we should withdraw entirely from supporting any Governmental scheme?’55 
Elsewhere, he was likely to conclude a report with an impressionistic statement along the 
following lines: ‘I feel that Oxfam can feel generally satisfied with the quality and direction 
of its assistance.’56 
 Numerous examples exist of the objections being raised to Llewellyn’s ‘depressing’ 
reports. Field Directors in particular were hardly likely to share his scepticism, since anything 
less than a judgment declaring ‘success’, ‘value for money’ or ‘excellence’ might later be 
used to question their own selection of a project in the first place. Others might take a more 
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strategic approach, absorbing the criticism, but then making clear that the situation was now 
different (that is, in the weeks since Llewellyn’s visit), and that therefore funding should be 
continued and even renewed.57 At Committee stage, then, Llewellyn’s special status as 
Appraiser could be reduced to just one voice among many others. The logic of bureaucracy 
then became inherently optimistic as the organisation accepted the criticism but continued to 
fund an ever-expanding portfolio of projects. 
 Frank assessments and general consensus about the ineffectiveness of a scheme were 
far more likely long after it had come to a definite end than when it was still in operation. 
When yet another new generation of staff arrived in the early 1970s  - those who would be 
attracted to the conscientisation movement of Latin America as a means of poverty reduction 
– they were more willing to point out the failures of the ‘scattered’ nature of Oxfam’s aid 
policy of the previous decade.58 It was only at this point, for instance, that Llewellyn was 
able to get Oxfam as a whole to finally accept that its flagship project in India, the gramdan  
land reform movement, had been beset by many of the same mismatches between developers’ 
aims and recipient interests that occurred in many a failed project of the UN’s technical 
assistance programme. 59 
 Yet this generation too would in turn become committed to the more concentrated 
forms of assistance provided in countries such as Tanzania. Even when staff began to know 
of President Nyrere’s use of force in his villagisation project, their shared wider commitment 
to ujaama made them, at best, reluctant to see the failings of the scheme and, at worst, 
complicit in some of the abuses. As Adrian Moyes wrote of forced villagisation in 1975, ‘in 
the long-run it will turn out to be right; without some such move the chance of building a 
better society was slipping away.’60 The problematic involvement of Oxfam and Christian 
Aid in Tanzania has been set out at length by Michael Jennings, but here we can see how it 
diminished the type of aid appraisal that Llewellyn had long strove towards.61  
 It is not difficult to see how Llewellyn’s phrase, the ‘Oxfam bias’, covers what others 
of a different scholarly persuasion might identify as the forms of governmentality that have as 
their effect the perpetuation of the very systems of which they are a part.62 But, importantly, 
these effects were also the products of the social interaction of individuals within an 
organisation concerned with the ‘interpretation of events’ through which success could be 
proclaimed.63 Field directors were unlikely to criticise partners on the ground they had 
worked with for many years. All individuals, as in any organisation, did not wish to readily 
admit that their professional efforts over many years had actually been of no real 
significance. Collectively, Oxfam staff focussed on one particular region, such as all those 
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connected to the Africa Committee, had an interest in telling the Executive and Council of the 
good works being conducted in their area. And the nature of fundraising, which always 
sought out the success story to sell to a mass donating public, encouraged a type of field 
reporting that identified spectacular returns on the investment of altruism. No wonder, then, 
that when Llewellyn’s more general observations on the need for greater planning and 
concentration of Oxfam’s aid policy were actually discussed within all levels of the 
organisation, they came up against a range of other agendas, interests and predilections that 
meant his prescriptions were diluted, diverted or deferred.64 
 As early as mid-1970 Llewellyn had become disillusioned with his role. He wrote to 
Kirkley that, ‘I’ve been in Oxfam long enough to recognize a peripheral activity when I see 
one.’65 Persuaded on this occasion to stay in his post, he nevertheless remained concerned 
about his ‘limited value’ to Oxfam.66 He found it ‘ludicrous’ that he was supposedly a key 
part of the Overseas Aid Division yet knew he could simply be ignored and, as a 
consequence, ‘served little useful purpose’ other than the ‘PR role in merely existing as a 
title’.67 Feeling his role to be too ‘passive’ he continued to be asked to be transferred to 
another position.68 Without a ‘mandatory constraint’ arising from his reports, which would 
have forced field directors to change their practices, his function was ‘sterile’.69 At the end of 
1973 he obtained his wish and he was allowed to become a consultant to the field directors 
operating in his beloved Asia, from which position he thought he could exercise greater 
influence through informal guidance of field staff.70 
 However, the problems he had identified with the optimism surrounding aid appraisal 
did not disappear. Llewellyn was succeeded in 1974 by the long-serving field director, Chris 
Howse, who was promoted to the adapted role of Evaluation Officer.71 His position, unlike 
Llewellyn’s, was located within and not outside the Overseas Aid Division of the NGO. 
While this gave him better access to field directors and ensured his reports could not so easily 
be overlooked, it also meant he was subject to far more control than the free-ranging 
Llewellyn. His job description especially oriented him towards more positive ends. Instead of 
being able to identify what did not work, he was steered towards suggesting improvements, 
thereby working on the assumption that everything Oxfam was doing was worthwhile to 
some degree.72 It meant he aligned more closely with the more optimistic – and 
impressionistic – evaluations that others continued to make. In contrast to Llewellyn’s dour 
opening to his tour reports, Howse was more likely to jauntily begin with a statement such as, 
‘the overall impression is one of considerable progress’.73 
  15 
 
Others reporting from the field also continued to offer the type of vague conclusion so 
disliked by Llewellyn. For all that appraisal was professionalised throughout the 1970s and 
beyond, Oxfam staff could still sign off reports with statements such as ‘all are doing such a 
wonderful job of work.74 The future official historian of Oxfam, Maggie Black, wrote of her 
whistle-stop tour of Africa in the 1970s that she was impressed by all she saw, suggesting the 
world view of a tourist as much as a professional surveyor.75 Later, in 1983, Ian Somerville 
marvelled at everything Oxfam was doing in Kenya and Tanzania and in 1989 M. J. Butcher 
reported on just how hard at work everyone was in Oxfam’s operations in Mali and 
Senegal.76 Even into the 1990s, in their reports to the various overseas committees, visitors 
from headquarters could prefer the chatty style of the spirited traveller than the sober prose of 





It needs to be emphasised that Oxfam was ahead of the curve on aid appraisal. For all the 
difficulties the organisation had in dealing with the consequences of Llewellyn’s reports the 
fact is they did recognise the need for project assessment in 1968 and they did act upon it. 
This put the organisation alongside a handful of its larger counterparts elsewhere, such as 
CARE and the Red Cross, and showed an awareness of the need for evaluation expressed 
within the official development machinery. But it also put it ahead of its equivalents and 
competitors in Britain. At the time of Llewellyn’s initial appointment, other charities did not 
prioritise appraisal to the same extent, else they simply lacked the resources to commit to 
staff not focussed on the immediate present or the near future. War on Want, Christian Aid 
and Save the Children had all not yet embarked on the forms of aid effectiveness testing that 
would increasingly come to the fore across the sector in later decades. Younger NGOs, too, 
such as Tearfund, were also not engaging in project appraisal, though here the reasons were 
also influenced by a commitment to only work with certain types of partner organisation.78 
 It was only at the end of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign that the need for 
project appraisal was made clear to the NGO sector. The FAO appointed J. A. Ponsioen of 
the Institute for Social Studies in The Hague to undertake a rudimentary assessment of the 
projects funded through FFHC. His conclusions were generally favourable, though he pointed 
to a list of problems of the sort Llewellyn had been articulating for some time. This prompted 
many within the NGO sector to push for further appraisal. In particular, Freddie Lees, 
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secretary to the NGO umbrella body, VCOAD, believed that with total funds being expended 
by NGOs on development reaching £700 million by the end of the 1960s, the lack of co-
ordination across the sector and within organisations simply could not continue.79 Other 
NGOs then followed Oxfam’s lead. Save the Children launched a full review of all aspects of 
its organisation in 1972 and by 1973 Christian Aid had commissioned an independent 
assessment of all the projects it funded in Botswana.80  
 Nevertheless, this ought not to make us believe that issues about the appraisal of aid 
have been resolved or that, through a reflection on the results of assessment, NGOs have been 
able to define better their humanitarian role. These debates have continued. Indeed, in 1987, 
Llewellyn finished his memoirs with a reflection on the purpose of aid that still recognised a 
‘modest role’ for charities: ‘the chief role of do-gooders was less to change the world than to 
prevent – if they could with the means to hand – things from getting any worse’.81 This was a 
sentiment unlikely to have chimed with his more ambitious colleagues in the 1960s and 
1970s. But it was one that was quietly in accord with the ‘do no harm’ principle associated 
with the Quakers and which pervaded the early atmosphere of Oxfam. Moreover, it was one 
that has increasingly come to be put forward by the likes of humanitarian commentators such 
as David Reiff, who have sought to rein in NGOs from some of their more extensive roles, 
especially when aligned to the security agenda since the 1990s. Here, NGOs are to be praised 
for the practical work they can achieve, especially in relief and rehabilitation, but these 
authors doubt whether NGOs ought to be the agents to securing more ambitious ends, be it 
the end of poverty or the end of the abuse of human rights.82 As Llewellyn himself put it in 
1972: 
 
We should not reinforce the bias any further by making our decisions on the basis of optimistic 
assumptions about what is likely to happen, and call our attitude pragmatic. . . . we should make 
our greatest efforts to control what is primarily in our power to control (where we can be held 
accountable for results) and not spend too long in those rarefied uplands where the intangibles take 
over, the rose-tinted spectacles colour reality for us, and accountability is to God alone.83 
 
 The best account of the self-perpetuating nature of the development infrastructure 
remains Ferguson’s detailed ethnography of Lesotho in the 1980s.  He excluded NGOs from 
his account but Mann’s more recent work on NGOs shows how they too can be incorporated 
into the interpretation. If we also follow Mosse’s lead and add to the analysis an account of 
the social life of appraisal as various actors proclaimed a project’s success then we can see 
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how, even before the massive expansion of NGO activity after the 1970s, institutions on their 
own provided their own internal logics of governmentality. For an organisation such as 
Oxfam, rapidly expanding into the developing world and doing so assisted by staff in swiftly 
growing departments, various institutional and personal agendas clearly benefitted from a 
more optimistic assessment of what was taking place on the ground. Partners could be re-
funded, donors could be satisfied, field directors could be rewarded and staff at headquarters 
could further their careers. This is not to say that altruism did not reside behind any one of 
these motives. But it all served to focus attention on the expansion of Oxfam’s activities 
rather than on the quality of the aid delivered. 
 It remains open to further discussion as to whether aid appraisal systems introduced 
after the 1970s and alongside the massive injections of funds from official sources into NGO 
income streams has answered many of the concerns Oxfam debated internally in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. But the point here is not really about whether aid appraisal improved. As 
Llewellyn’s assessments and their social life within Oxfam demonstrate, it is less the quality 
of the appraisal made and more the history of how such reports were received and interpreted, 
that perhaps has more relevance to the NGO community today. No one within Oxfam 
seriously objected to what Llewellyn was doing or to his findings. But just about everyone 
that read his reports was able to dispute a detail and deliver a different overall view from the 
one he provided. This was the essential optimism that Llewellyn found within his ‘bias’. He 
knew it was absolutely crucial to the maintenance of the good work that Oxfam and others 
were doing from the 1960s. But he knew too that it was crucial to the development of a 
system of ‘nongovernmentality’ that would help to consolidate the presence of NGOs across 
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